Medical Deduction: Scope and Purpose by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 28 | Issue 2 Article 8
Winter 1953
Medical Deduction: Scope and Purpose
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1953) "Medical Deduction: Scope and Purpose," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 28 : Iss. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol28/iss2/8
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
doubtedly, there are instances where a concern should be permitted to
initiate an action where it is doing business, and there are also situations
in which such suit would be disproportionately detrimental to the interests
of the defendant. Coordinate use of Sections 1391(c) and 1404 will
bestow the initial privilege upon the plaintiff corporation, while leaving
the prevention of trials conducted in improper forums to the discretion
of the court.
Interpretation of the statute herein suggested results in operation
designed both to achieve just results and avoid unnecessary inconvenience
to the parties involved. If Congress desired a different meaning, it thus
becomes its duty to clarify the matter by amendment.
MEDICAL DEDUCTION: SCOPE AND PURPOSE
As long ago as 1848 John Stuart Mill, although not advocating
progressive taxation, advanced a theory whereby amounts necessary to
maintain the health of an individual would be exempt from taxation.'
Since the federal tax system is a progressive one, hence inferably more
responsive to ability to pay, one would imagine that an effective medical
deduction would by now be embedded in the federal income tax struc-
ture. But a puzzling ambiguity has recently arisen which makes it
impossible to predict the deductibility of an expenditure that might also
confer incidental non-medical benefits upon the taxpayer.
The Internal Revenue Code allows the deduction of expenses for
the "medical care" of the taxpayer or his dependents, 2 and rather vaguely
defines that care as including "amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease or for the purpose of
affecting any structure of the body."' 3  Because congressional comment,
1. MILL, PRINCIPALS OF POLITICAL ECONOmY 828 (Ashley Ed. 1926).
2. The only requirement for a "dependent" is that he receive more than half his
support from the taxpayer. See I.T. 4034, 1950-2 Cumt. BULL. 28 (the deduction was
allowed for a married daughter) ; I.T. 3703, 1945 Cume. BULL. 127 (the deduction was
allowed for the expenses of a person making more than $500 per year, but nevertheless
receiving more than half her support from the taxpayer).
3. 26 U.S.C. § 23(x). A medical expense as defined in this section would poten-
tially include almost everything for which money could be spent. See Hodgkin, If You
Eat to Stay Healthy-Here's New Light on the Medical Deduction, 30 TAXES 206
(1952), in which the author facetiously describes a fictitious case where the Tax Court
allows the deduction of everything from whisky to cigarettes.
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for the most part, does little more than repeat the statutory provisions,'
it is of minimal aid to interpretation. The application of this law should
be based on a sound understanding of the general function of income
tax deductions.
Deductions fall into two primary classes, according to their purpose.
A few are directed toward non-tax policies, such as the support of
charitable institutions and the development of the country's resources. 5
The great majority, however, are designed to distribute the burden of
taxation as equitably as possible.0 In determining which class em-
braces the medical deduction it will help to recognize that income can
be divided into two categories: (1) that which must be spent on necessi-
ties if a minimum standard of living is to be maintained; (2) that over
which the taxpayer can exercise real discretion as to its disposition.
There is a strong argument that, from an ethical point of view, only
the second category of income should be subject to taxation;7 the federal
tax law attempts, although imperfectly, to effectuate this ethical concept.8
Exemption of small incomes from taxation is not of itself sufficient
to assure a minimum standard of living, however, because necessary
expenditures may vary widely within a given family from one year to
the next. Small incomes become even smaller when irregular and un-
avoidable expenditures must be made. Necessary medical expenses lessen
a person's ability to pay just as surely as would a reduction in income.9
The Tax Court made the same observation in L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580,
583 (1949). "As the broad and comprehensive language of this section is susceptible to
a variety of conflicting interpretations, we feel impelled, in order to determine the
limits of its construction, to inquire into the Congressional intent which lay behind
the enactment of this legislation."
4. The only helpful statements were made by the Senate Finance Committee:
"This allowance is recommended in consideration of the heavy tax burden that must
be borne by individuals during the existing emergency (World War II) and of the
desirability of maintaining the present high level of public health and morale." SEN.
REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942); and Representative Henshaw: "This
amendment will be a help to persons or families having to undergo unusual outlays for
medical purposes in any year." 88 CONG. REc. 8469 (1942).
5. The deductions referred to are found in the Internal Revenue Code, sections
23(o) and 23 (if) respectively.
6. This type of analysis was employed by the circuit court in Morrell v. Com-
missioner, 107 F.2d 34, 36 (3d Cir. 1939), aff'g, 38 B.T.A. 239 (1938).
7. "It is to be remembered that this assumption-that the best system 'of tax
distribution requires the exemption of subsistence incomes-is based entirely upon the
consideration of the ethical or moral issues involved." STRAYER, THx TAXATION OF
SmALL IxcomEs 67 (1939).
8. The $600 personal exemption and the subsequent exemptions for spouse and
dependents are incomplete attempts to leave a bare subsistence income untaxed. See 5
MERTENs, LAW OF FmERAL INcOME TAXATION § 32.08 (1942).
9: For an excellent discussion of these problems see STRAYER, THE TAxATION 9.w
SM.AL INcOmEs c. 3 (1939).
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In 1942 the Treasury Department, recognizing that these factors, par-
ticularly when aggravated by higher tax rates, would leave the average
family even fewer reserves with which to support the burden of heavy
medical expenses, suggested the medical deduction.' ° It was created
for the direct benefit of the taxpayer, as a measure of his ability to pay,
in contrast with the charitable contributions type of deduction which
was evolved for the benefit of the organizations which receive the
donations.1' Judicial interpretation can either preserve or destroy this
basic distinction.
In the leading case of Edward A. Havey,12 Judge Van Fossan,
while disallowing the deduction, 13 set out four tests for the determina-
tion of a deductible medical expense.' 4 In essence they are: (1) Was
it incurred at the direction or suggestion of a physician? (2) Did the
treatment bear directly on the physical condition in question? (3) Could
the treatment be expected to be efficacious? (4) Was the disease the
proximate cause of the expenditure? Two basic requirements seem to
be implied. The first and third questions probe the reasonableness of
the treatment attempted. The other two demand a causal relationship
between the expenditure and the disease. The material inquiry would
be: Was the expense reasonably motivated by disease? In L. Keever
Stringham,'5 the Tax Court followed an earlier Treasury Decision'0 by
allowing a deduction for the expenses of a trip directly and solely
undertaken to cure an acute respiratory infection. Between the Havey
10. In March of 1942, Mr. Randolph E. Paul, then tax consultant to the Secretary
of the Treasury, spoke before the House Ways and Means Committee:
"In view of the increases in tax rates which the present situation has necessitated,
we feel that in some respects these exemptions and credits are now inadequate. We,
therefore suggest to the Committee that to achieve a more equitable distribution of the
tax burden, it would be desirable to enact the following changes:
"1. A deduction should be allowed for medical expenses over a specified percent
of net income, but limited to a maximum amount." Hearing before Committee on Ways
and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1611, 1612 (1942).
In a letter to the Indiana Law Journal, Mr. Paul said, "You are correct, therefore,
in assuming that we were moved by the consideration that the higher taxes would
considerably weaken the average person's ability to meet these large and unavoidable
expenses. As a matter of fact the high rates intensified a situation which had existed
previous to the 1942 Act."
11. 5 MEPTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxAToN §31.01 (1942).
12. 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
13. Petitioner's wife suffered a coronary occlusion, and after she had recovered
enough to travel, the petitioner, on the advice of a physician, took her to New Jersey in
the Summer and Arizona in the Winter. Petitioner had often vacationed in both places.
14. 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949).
15. 12 T.C. 580 (1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1949),
16. I.T. 3786, 1946-1 CUK. BULL. 75,
266
NOTES
decision, holdin& for the Commissioner, and Stringham, for the tax-
payer, a general outline of the medical deduction was constructed along
lines which served the common end of both the taxpayer and the
government.' 7
The situation was not to remain clearly defined, however. In the
1951 case of Samuel Ochs,' the facts were similar to those of Stringham
except that an intensifying cause of the illness was removed from the
sick person rather than the sick person being taken from the cause.' 9
On the basis of this difference, the Tax Court held for the Commis-
sioner against the spirit of Stringham. The two cases were easily dis-
tinguished by the Tax Court which pointed out that in Stringham the
daughter was sent to boarding school because of her own illness, while
in Ochs the daughters, who were perfectly healthy, were sent away
because of their mother's illness.20  The Second Circuit, ignoring the
Tax Court's finding of fact, affirmed on the strength of its own belief
that the Ochs children were not removed primarily as a cure for their
mother's illness, as the Tax Court had specifically found, but for their
own good because their mother was unable to care for them.2' The
17. A notable exception to this success was John L. Seymour, 14 T.C. 1111 (1950),
which held a medical expense non-deductible because it was also a capital expenditure.
The court did not even consider pro-rating the deduction, but said "[w]e are unable
to find in the history of the statute any evidence of an intent by Congress to create
an exception to the general rule that capital expenditures are not deductible as current
expenses." Id. at 1118.
18. 17 T.C. 130 (1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1952).
19. The taxpayer's wife had been operated on for goiter and a carcinoma of the
throat discovered. It had spread too far to be completely removed, so X-ray treatments
were used after the operation. As a result of the operation Mrs. Ochs was unable to
speak above a whisper. When her voice had not returned after several years, a doctor
advised that the constant strain of trying to manage her two small daughters had
probably prevented the return of her voice and might cause a recurrence of the cancer.
He suggested that Mrs. Ochs and her daughters be separated until she could be pro-
nounced cured. Since Mrs. Ochs was working part time, it was more economical to
move the children than to move her.
20. "The facts in the Stringiam case are distinguishable from those present in
the instant case in that in the Stringham case the expenses incurred in sending the
taxpayer's child to boarding school in Arizona were incurred because of the child's
own ill health. This is not true in the instant case." Samuel Ochs, 17 T.C. 130, 134
(1951).
21. The Tax Court's finding of facts were: "Petitioner's purpose in sending the
children to boarding school during the year 1946 was to alleviate his wife's pain and
suffering in caring for the children by reason of her inability to speak above a whisper
and to prevent recurrence of the cancer which was responsible for the condition of
her voice. He also thought it would be good for the children to be away from their
mother as much as possible while she was unable to speak to them above a whisper."
Samuel Ochs, 17 T.C. 130, 132 (1951).
The circuit court, however, found that the facts "serve to illustrate that the ex-
pensr, here were madq nece5.ry by the loss of the wife's services, and that the only
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circuit court's apparent approval of the Tax Court's decision can be
explained by the discrepancy in their findings of fact.22
The confusion within the Ochs case itself, however, is insignificant
when compared with the confusion which it introduces into the inter-
pretation of the medical deduction. The Stringham case held that travel
and certain living expenses away from home are deductible if they are
expended in a reasonable attempt to prevent or cure a specific disease.
The Ochs case limits this holding by indicating that such traveling and
living expenses are deductible only if it is the sick person who is doing
the traveling.23 The facts admittedly are different, but it may be
doubted that there is any real distinction, for medical deduction pur-
poses, between taking a patient from an unhealthy environment and
removing an unhealthy environment from a patient. When the medical
deduction is seen as a test of ability to pay, the validity of the Tax
Court's distinction may be seriously questioned.
24
Any statute stated in specific terms inevitably cannot cover future
situations which fall within its purpose, although not within its language.
Other jurisdictions which have a medical deduction have sacrified policy
for certainty. Minnesota's legislature specified that its deduction would
be allowed only if payments were for certain enumerated items, such as
hospitalization, medical and dental services, and drugs. 25  The Canadian
reason for allowing them as a deduction is that the wife also received a benefit." Ochs
v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1952).
The Tax Court found that the expenditure was made for the mother's benefit and
also benefited the children, while the circuit court said that the expenditure was for
the benefit of the children and also benefited the mother. This factual deviation is
substantial enough to change the result and, of course, is completely irregular. See note
35 infra.
22. "We do not think that the decisions discussed in the opinion of the Tax Court
and the briefs of the parties have any real bearing upon the issues involved in this
appeal." Ochs v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1952).
23. However, there might be some justification for saying that the fact that the
traveling was done by someone other than the sick person raises a rebutable presump-
tion that the expenditure was not motivated by the disease. This interpretation of the
Ochs case would, at least, let the petitioner prove his intent.
24. Unfortunately the Supreme Court did not consider the deduction important
enough to clarify, for certiorari was denied in the Ochs case. 21 L.W. 3094 (1952).
However, a case has recently been decided in the District Court of Minnesota which
seems to be at odds with the Ochs decision. The petitioner was disabled so that she
could travel only in a private car. Her doctor advised work by way of occupational
therapy, and the District Court allowed her to deduct her taxi fare to and from work
as a medical expense. Misfeldt v. Kelm (D.C. Minn.), 5 C.C.H. 1952 FED. TAx REP.
9495.
25. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09 (11). New York has a medical deduction which
is fashioned closely after the federal law. N. Y. TAx LAW § 360.
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Parliament provided that only amounts paid to certain named institu-
tions or classes of persons could be deducted. -6  The most direct effect
of the Minnesota and Canadian deductions is the support of the items
and institutions named. Only imperfectly do they lessen the tax burden
of medical expenses, since many of these expenses will not be included
in the specific language of the law.27 Statutes such as these are most
appropriate to the charitable contributions type of deduction, which seeks
the encouragement of specific institutions and activities. They are
inadequate for a deduction which is an integral part of the income tax
system, directed only toward its more perfect functioning.
If a statute is created to reduce tax liability in years when certain
unavoidable expenses are incurred, then it should be stated in terms of
those unavoidable expenses rather than in terms of specific payments
which it is hoped will approximate the real purpose. While an inter-
pretation based on specific requirements is inevitable, it should be
expressed with regard to the end desired and not collateral considerations.
Within the purview of the medical deduction, the popular meaning of
the term "medical" is a collateral consideration, while "unavoidable
expenses made necessary by disease" designates the real purpose. It is
true that policy must sometimes be sacrificed for practicability, but
before retreating with Canada and Minnesota to the haven of particu-
larity, an attempt should be made to drive a test that is specific enough
to insure certainty yet sufficiently flexible to embrace the real policy of
the deduction. 28
All the components of an adequate test had been implied in the
pre-Ochs decisions, although they had never been expressed in one con-
26. The original Canadian Medical Deduction, and subsequent changes are con-
tained in the following:
(1) Income Tax Act, 15 Geo. VI, c. 51, § 6 (1951, 2d Sess.);
(2) Income Tax Act and Income War Tax Act, 13 Geo. VI, c. 25, § 11(1) (1949,
2d Sess.) ;
(3) Income Tax Act, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 52, § 26(6) (1948);
(4) Income War Tax Act, 10 Geo. VI, c. 55, § 4(7) (1946);
(5) Income War Tax Act, 9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 23, § 3(2) (1945);
(6) Income War Tax Act, 8 & 9 Geo. VI, c. 43, § 4(4) (1944);
(7) Income War Tax Act, 6 & 7 Geo. VI, c. 28, § 5(6) (1942).
27. Medical science has such varied methods and is progressing so rapidly that
an attempt to enumerate all the things that could be used in the cure or prevention of
disease would be futile. Mr. Stringham's expense in curing his daughter's respiratory
infection certainly would not have been deductible under either Minnesota or Canadian
law.
28. When contemplating these tests one should keep in mind the abuses which
they are intended to avoid. Since the medical deduction must be broad in order to
achieve its purpose, it offers an easy opportunity to evaders and tax cheats. Ordinary
living expenses will be deducted because they are also beneficial to health, and regularly
planned vacation trips because they happen to coincide with sickness.
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cise statement. 29  A justifiable inference from these cases is that a
deductible expense involves two distinct elements: (1) a specific
disease,30 either present or imminent; (2) an expense made in a reason-
able attempt to cure or prevent that disease. The existence of a specific
disease can usually be objectively determined by reference to the facts,
but the second element, that of the taxpayer's motivation, is more
difficult since it necessitates an appraisal of the subjective reasons for
the expenditure.
The determination of the imminence of disease must, of necessity,
be based upon an evaluation of the existing symptoms. 31 In the realm
of acute disturbances, the necessity for prompt treatment will minimize
the incidence of claims based upon fictitious ailments.32  But when a
chronic condition is involved, the increased opportunity of accommodat-
ing an indicated treatment to the patient's personal predilections will
often allow the expenditure to simultaneously engender medical benefits
and non-medical enjoyments. 33 It is then that the subjective element of
"reasonable attempt" becomes important.
"Attempt" means exactly that; it refers to the element of motiva-
tion and demands that there be a causal connection between the disease
29. The Havey case gave the best single expression of the requirements: "It
seems clear to us that the deduction in question may be claimed only where there is
a health or body condition coming within the statutory concept and where the expense
was incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of such condition. An incidental
benefit is not enough." Edward A. Havey, 12 T.C. 409, 413 (1949).
30. "The Congressional intent is sufficiently evident to require the showing of the
present existence or imminent probability of a disease . . . as the initial step in quali-
fying an expenditure as a medical expense." L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580, 584
(1949).
31. The court must decide in each case whether or not the existing symptoms are
sufficient to justify treatment. The expert testimony of a physician will always be the
best evidence, but other factors such as the age and condition of the patient, and the
symptoms themselves will also be valuable. In Bessie Cohn, 10 T.C.M. 29 (1951), the
taxpayer's age was an important factor in allowing the deduction.
32. It is interesting to note that of all the cases which have arisen over the
medical deduction none have involved an acute disease. In those cases in which an
acute disease has existed the deduction was always being sought for the expenses of
convalescence or treating the chronic after effects. See Samuel Dobkin, 15 T.C. 886
(1950) (change of climate following coronary occlusion-deduction disallowed);
Edward A. Havey, 12 T.C. 409 (1949) (expenses of change of climate following
coronary occlusion disallowed) ; Martin W. Keller, 8 T.C.M. 685 (1949) (doctor advised
change of climate because of general rundown condition-deduction disallowed).
33. Expenditures may be classified by the kind of treatment for which they are
made as well as the type of disease. Acute diseases will almost always require "pro-
fessional treatment" while a chronic disease may necessitate "non-professional services."
"Non-professional services" raise the difficult questions. Deductibility should not hinge
on the professional or non-professional nature of the measures taken, but services by
non-medical personnel will properly raise a doubt in the court's mind as to the purpose
of the expenditure, and it is the petitioner's task to dispel that doubt.
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and the expenditure. 34 The ailment must be the inducing cause-the
element without which the expenditure would not have been made35-
rather than a contributing factor. The proportion of the expense to
the taxpayer's total income36 and any prior incurrence of the same type
of expense in the absence of disease will be relevant factors. 37 As indi-
cated, problems of motivation will be minimal where acute ailments are
involved, maximal where chronic disturbances are being inspected. The
unfortunate Ochs decision, where a chronic carcinoma was the basis of
the taxpayer's claim, attests the danger of accentuation of benefits con-
ferred. A different result would have been reached if the factual inquiry
were orientated toward motivation and ignored the immaterial element
of ancilary benefits.
Once the factual element of attempt is met, only the reasonablness
of the effort remains to be determined. The attempted cure need not
be successful, of course, and while advice of a physician will be helpful,
it should not be conclusive evidence of deductibility. Nor should such
advice be a prerequisite to establish the reasonableness of the attempt.38
The test here suggested is one well suited to bring purpose and
result together. When the elements of reasonable attempt and specific
or imminent disease are both present-and not unless they are present-
the situation exists for which the deduction was created; it should,
34. "Although we do not feel that the bona fides of a taxpayer's motive in incur-
ring an expense should be determinative of its deductibility, we do believe that we
should accord it considerable weight." L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580, 585 (1949).
35. Occasionally an expenditure will be made for more than one reason. The
Treasury Department anticipated the problem by providing that the expense must be
"primarily for the prevention or cure of a specific (disease)." U.S. Treas. Reg. 103,
§19.23(x)-i (1943). They seem to suggest an apportionment of the motivation; if
the expense is more than fifty percent motivated by a specific disease then it is deduct-
ible. But to be consistent with its purpose the deduction cannot be allowed for an
expense which would have been made regardless of disease, even though the disease
was a causal factor, because in such a situation there had been no additional burden.
Rather than grapple with a quantitative analysis of the taxpayer's motivation it is
simpler and more accurate to ask whether the expense would have been made in the
absence of the disease. See note 37 infra.
36. In L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580 (1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir.
1949), the great size of the expense in comparison with the taxpayer's total income
was heavily relied upon to show that the expenditure would not have been made but
for the disease. If the taxpayer had a very large income such evidence would be
meaningless, of course.
37. Judge Frank, in his dissenting opinion in the Ochs case suggested this question
as an objective test of the taxpayer's motivation: "Would the taxpayer, considering
his income and his living standard, normally spend money in this way regardless of
illness?" Ochs v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692, 697 (2d Cir. 1952) (dissent).
38. The fees of chiropractors (I.T. 3598, 1943 Cum. Bull. 157) and Christian
Science Practitioners (Bureau letter, February 2, 1943, in 3 C.C.H. 1943 FED. TAX REP.
1f 6175) also have been held deductible.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
therefore, be allowed. Although matters of proof will never be simple, a
clear understanding of what must be proven will resolve the present am-
biguity so that both the courts and counselors will have a clear concept
of the taxpayer's rights under the medical deduction.
PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBTFUL CLAIMS
DURING PROBATE
During the probate of an estate, claims based on lost notes amount-
ing to $29,000 were filed against the estate after their legal existence
could have been destroyed by the non-claim statute' had the adminis-
trator acted promptly. The administrator disallowed the claims, how-
ever, and defended the estate in actions brought by the claimants. The
heirs were allowed to participate in the trial, but " . . . were not par-
ties to said actions and had no control over them .. ."2 After a
verdict for the claimants, the administrator did not file a motion for a
new trial although the heirs attempted to induce him to do so. There-
upon, the heirs themselves petitioned for a new trial, and upon its
denial, they sued the administrator and recovered damages based on
his inadequate protection of the estate. Victory, however, was short-
lived, or at least postponed, when the appellate court reversed. The Court
held that the administrator's, failure to utilize the statute of non-claim
did not constitute an actionable wrong, and that if the suits had been
improperly defended, the heirs' remedy was to appeal rather than to
collaterally attack the judgment by suing the administrator.3
The Riddell decision does more than arouse sympathy for a few
possibly injured heirs. It raises the general problem of how parties
interested in an estate, such as heirs or creditors, 4 can protect their
interests and control the functioning of the administrator when doubtful
claims are filed against the estate. This problem may arise at various
1. The statute of non-claim is a special statute of limitation in probate proceedings
which requires that claims be filed within a certain period in order to be recoverable
against the estate. State ex rel Buder v. Brand, 305 Mo. 321, 327, 265 S.W. 989, 991
(1824). See notes 19 and 21 infra. For a discussion of claims which are not barred by
the statute of non-claim, see Comment, 41 MIcE. L. Rxv. 920 (1943).
2. Riddell National Bank v. Englehart, 105 N.E.2d 357, 360 (Ind. App. 1952).
3. Id. at 361.
4. Any person who has a claim on the estate, whether heir or creditor, is possibly
endangered by the recovery of a doubtful claim by a creditor and therefore may be
an interested party within the meaning of this note. Consequently, references throughout
the note to "heirs" will generally be applicable to "creditors" also.
